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They Try: How the Supreme Court has 
Addressed Issues of  Racial and Gender Discrimination 
in the Jury Selection Process
Jana Kelnhofer 
With the recent rise in recorded instances of  police 
brutality, use of  social media, and acquittals of  police 
of cers  involved,  the  long debate about  the  role  race 
plays in United States jury selection is once again at the 
forefront of  the national dialogue. Legal precedents ex-
ist which seek to prevent blatant racial and gender dis-
crimination in the United States’ legal system, proving 
that the legal system has been receptive to these con-
versations in the past. This review examines the ways in 
which the United States Supreme Court has addressed 
issues of  racial and gender discrimination in the jury 
selection process.   
The methodology of  this paper is rooted in the 
empirical analysis of  U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 
cases concerning claims of  discrimination during jury 
selection.  The   rst  half   analy es  the  cases  that  the 
Court ruled on prior to the Jury Selection and Service 
Act (JSSA) of  1968 and the second half  analy es cases 
that impact the “modern jury” in America. The con-
clusion discusses ways in which the Court’s rulings still 
leave room for discrimination.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution sets up the federal American jury system, but 
does so with little speci cation. The Sixth Amendment 
reads: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of  the state and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of  the nature 
and cause of  the accusation; to be confronted 
with  the witnesses against him;  to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of  counsel for 
his defense (US Const. amend. VI).
If  the sole mention of  an “impartial jury” (mean-
ing a jury that can judge the facts with an open mind) 
in the Sixth Amendment was not enough to convince 
the colonists that juries were a central part of  the le-
gal process (Hans and Vidmar 49), the Framers of  the 
Constitution included the Seventh Amendment, which 
states, “In suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of  trial by 
ABSTRACT
The rise of  publici ed police brutality cases (but not the rise in number of  cases themselves) 
has resulted in an increase of  public scrutiny of  the court process. More often than not, police 
of cers are found not guilty by a jury of  their peers, only for the public to later  nd out that the 
jury was composed almost entirely of  whites. How did this process start? How does it persist? 
Has the legal system attempted to address this problem, and discrimination in the jury selection 
process in general? By examining past Supreme Court decisions, this review explores the ways 
that the Supreme Court has addressed racial and gender discrimination in the jury selection pro-
cess. However, since the Court does not have enforcement powers, this review also explores the 
tactics that prosecutors have developed to skirt around their opinions. 
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jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise re-examined in any court of  the United 
States, than according to the rules of  common law” 
(US Const. amend. VII). As a result, they extended the 
right to a jury to civil cases as well.
The United States Constitution was written during 
a time when legally owning another human through 
the form of  slavery was permissible and  when women 
were still prevented from voting. Therefore, it should 
come as no surprise that the authors did not consid-
er issues of  racial and gender discrimination nor how 
their system might perpetuate such discrimination 
while framing their document. Although the Framers 
likely felt no responsibility to prevent future racial and 
gender discrimination in the criminal process because 
of  the societal norms under which they lived at the 
time, states had an opportunity to exercise their power 
when writing their own laws pertaining to the selection 
of  jurors. In fact, the First Judiciary Act of  1789 estab-
lished that federal jurors have to meet the quali cations 
required by the state in which the federal court was lo-
cated,  thereby  increasing the  in uence that  states had 
on the federal jury selection process (Fowler 2).
The jury selection process in most states proceeds 
in two parts. The  rst part is selection in which a state 
or federal of cial chooses names from a potential juror 
list (How Are Potential Jurors Selected?). When juries 
were initially established, and until 1968, a “key man” 
system was used in order to generate the original lists 
that jurors were chosen from. This system asked key 
members of  the community to recommend members 
of  the community that they believed were competent 
enough to stand trial (Hans and Vidmar 53). Since 
 communities  are  not  organi ed  randomly,  and  only 
certain subgroups were represented,” this system was 
discriminatory (Hans and Vidmar 53). For example, a 
key man in the South may have been less likely to rec-
ommend black jurors than white jurors due to social 
tensions and racism within the community. Although 
this “key man” system led to implicit, non-legislative 
instances of  discrimination, legislative discrimination 
continued in states with laws that prohibited certain 
groups, such as African-Americans and women, from 
sitting on juries. 
Alongside the Supreme Court, Congress played a 
vital role in passing the Jury Selection and Service Act 
(JSSA) of  1968, which mandated that juror lists be tak-
en from voting rolls, in an attempt to address issues of  
past discrimination within jury selection (Hale 57). The 
selection of  jurors from voting rolls presents problems 
since the people listed on the rolls are often the most 
politically engaged. Since minorities and low-income 
communities are the least likely to participate in the 
voting process, the system puts them at risk of  being 
left out from the jury selection (Hans and Vidmar 54). 
To prevent this, some states have started using driv-
er’s license registration lists in order to develop a more 
complete list from which to choose potential jurors.
The second process, ‘voir dire,’ allows judges and 
attorneys to pick and choose the ultimate jury pool by 
asking potential jurors questions and by gauging their 
body language and verbal responses (How Are Po-
tential Jurors Selected?). Two types of  challenges that 
attorneys may exercise in order to eliminate potential 
jurors from the pool are challenges of  cause and pe-
remptory challenges (Spears 1499). Challenges of  cause 
are not limited in number and can be used for legitimate 
instances of  suspected bias, such as a juror who lived 
next door to a defendant. These are also left “under the 
court’s control,” meaning that a judge has to approve a 
challenge for cause (Spears 1499).
Peremptory challenges, on the other hand, are 
limited in number and the attorney does not have to 
disclose the reasons for eliminating jurors. Attorneys 
are able to exercise this challenge in order to eliminate 
jurors that they believe to be subconsciously biased or 
lying. This is also an avenue for attorneys to discrimi-
nate against particular jurors due to their demograph-
ic characteristics (Spears 1499). It is worth noting that 
other countries, such as Great Britain and Canada, that 
do not have voir dire process before a trial believe that 
the United States’ system is unusual and unnecessary 
(Hans and Vidmar 48).
Prior to the JSSA, the Supreme Court only exam-
ined discrimination occurring during the selection pro-
cess. Following JSSA, the Court also ruled on instances 
of  attorney initiated discrimination in voir dire, most 
notably, through the peremptory challenge (Hale 57). 
Cases Before the Jury Service and Selec-
tion Act of  1968 
Strauder vs. West Virginia (1880) 
The   rst  case  the  Supreme  Court  heard  relating 
to ‘de jure’ (by law) discrimination in the compilation 
of  jury lists was Strauder vs. West Virginia (100 US 303 
(1880)). In Strauder, an all white jury convicted a black 
man in West Virginia of  murder (Schmidt 1415). The 
defendant argued that his Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause rights had been violated due 
to a West Virginia law which limited jury service to “all 
white male persons” (Schmidt 1415). Justice William 
Strong established that “[the Constitutional question] 
is whether, in the composition or selection of  jurors by 
whom he is to be indicted or tried, all persons of  his 
They Try: How the Supreme Court has Addressed Issues of  Racial and Gender Discrimination in the Jury Selection Process
33Scholarly Undergraduate Research Journal At Clark University|Volume IV
race or color may be excluded by law, solely because 
of  their race or color, so that by no possibility can any 
colored man sit upon the jury.” (Strauder). Justice Strong 
was explicit in stating that the case was not about the 
rights to a particular type of  jury in a trial, but about 
whether or not the process of  selecting a jury was con-
stitutional.
Writing for a six justice majority, Justice Strong 
argued that the prohibition of  a whole race of  peo-
ple from jury participation “is practically a brand upon 
them,  af xed by  the  law,  an  assertion  of   their  inferi-
ority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is 
an impediment to securing to individuals of  the race 
that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all 
others” (Strauder). Justice Strong went on to state that 
particular  state  laws may  con ne  the   jury   selection 
to males, to freeholders, to citi ens, to persons within 
certain ages, or to persons having educational quali -
cations” (Strauder). The Equal Protection Clause of  the 
Fourteenth Amendment is itself  a barrier to de jure ra-
cial discrimination via the jury selection process. As a 
result, the defendant’s conviction was overturned and 
laws preventing whole races of  people from partici-
pating in jury selection were ruled unconstitutional. In 
spite of  this ruling, states used other preventative mea-
sures such as the “key man” system to discriminate in 
the jury selection process.
Smith vs. Texas (1940) 
The next jury selection case that the Supreme 
Court heard dealt with de facto (not written into law, 
but experienced ‘by fact’) jury selection discrimination. 
In Smith vs. Texas (311 US 128 (1940)), the sheriff  of  
the county was responsible for choosing jurors from 
the list provided by the key man system and only chose 
white male jurors whom he recogni ed for the trial of  
a black defendant (Hale 194). Even though there was 
no law that prevented black people from serving on 
juries,  the  structural  racism  under which  the  of cials 
responsible for the selection of  juries operated within 
served to bring about the same effect. In his majority 
opinion, Justice Hugo Black wrote that “it is part of  
the established tradition in the use of  juries as instru-
ments of  public justice that the jury be a body truly 
representative of  the community” (Smith). Prior to this 
decision, no jurisprudence had advocated for a jury that 
is “representative” of  the community, with only a Con-
stitutional guarantee that the jury would be “impartial.” 
Glasser vs. United States (1942) 
Two years later, the Court agreed to hear Glasser vs. 
United States (315 US 60 (1942)). In Chicago, the League 
of  Women Voters had provided a list of  women to a 
county of cial responsible for choosing jurors to par-
ticipate in the voir dire process (Hale 197). In many 
states, women were subject to an  af rmative registra-
tion” policy in order to be eligible to be considered for 
jury duty (Hans and Vidmar 52). This policy exempted 
women from the jury selection process unless they opt-
ed in (Hans and Vidmar 52). In response, the League 
of  Women Voters and other politically active women’s 
groups  held  organi ing  events  to  encourage  women 
to sign up for jury selection. The women they recom-
mended had taken part in a training administered by a 
local prosecutor about jury duty to ensure the women 
were more aware of  the process (Hale 197). Because 
the training was administered by a local prosecutor, 
the defendants argued that these jurors had a more 
“pro-government” view of  legal proceedings and were 
less likely to remain impartial (Hale 197).
Despite the gendered nature of  the case, Justice 
Frank Murphy did not consider gender when writing 
the majority opinion. Instead, he emphasi ed the Smith 
ruling which held that juries needed to be “truly repre-
sentative of  the community, and not the organ of  any 
special group or class.”. Justice Murphy, in accordance 
with Smith, warned the of cials in charge of  selecting 
federal that “they must not allow the desire for compe-
tent jurors to lead them into selections which do not 
comport with the concept of  the jury as a cross-sec-
tion of  the community” (Glasser). In writing this, Justice 
Murphy reiterated the representative standard for juries 
mentioned in Smith while also establishing a “cross-sec-
tion of  the community” standard. Taken together, 
Glasser and Smith signal a transition from juror selec-
tion based on “competence” to jury selection based on 
a cross-sectional representation of  the community in 
which the trial is held (Hale 200). The Sixth Amend-
ment now guaranteed defendants the right to a repre-
sentative jury, but Justice Murphy s de nition of   rep-
resentative” would be tested in a case four years later. 
 h    vs  S uth rn        R      s (      
In  h     vs   S uth rn          R      s  (328 US 217 
(1946)), Gilbert Thiel sued the railroad company after 
he had jumped out of  a moving car under the charge 
that they should have known that he was “out of  his 
right mind” and prevented him from boarding the train. 
Jurors of  the trial were only wealthy, white businessmen 
because the state often refrained from calling hourly 
wage  earners  to  sit  for  jury duty due  to  the  nancial 
hardship a day of  jury duty may pose to them (Hans 
and Vidmar 55). Writing the majority opinion, Justice 
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Murphy had an opportunity to elaborate on his new 
standards authored in Glasser. Justice Murphy wrote 
that: 
[A representative cross-section] does not 
mean, of  course, that every jury must contain 
representatives of  all economic, social, reli-
gious, political, and geographical groups of  
the community; frequently such complete rep-
resentation would be impossible. But it does 
mean that prospective jurors shall be selected 
by court of cials without systematic and inten-
tional exclusion of  any of  these groups. Rec-
ognition must be given to the fact that those 
eligible for jury service are to be found in every 
stratum of  society. Jury competence is an indi-
vidual rather than a group or class matter.
Justice Murphy clari ed that while the virtual rep-
resentation of  every cross-section in a community on 
every jury is impossible, states must avoid systemati-
cally preventing any particular group from partaking in 
the juror selection process. He continued to admit that 
while the state’s reasoning for preventing wage earn-
ers from participating in the jury selection process is a 
nice gesture, any attempt to constitutionally allow this 
practice “would breathe life into any latent tendencies 
to establish the jury as the instrument of  the econom-
ically and socially privileged” (Thiel).  Therefore, it was 
unconstitutional to exclude this class of  people based 
on economic status, and Thiel’s initial conviction was 
overturned. 
 
Ballard vs. United States (1946)
Although the Court clari ed its position on repre-
sentative juries and had greatly raised the threshold for 
Constitutionally acceptable juror selection processes, 
it still had only ruled on discrimination on the basis 
of  class and race. With Ballard vs. United States (329 US 
187 (1946)),  the Court  nally considered the  issue of  
gender. In this case, female jurors were excluded for 
reasons that are “unclear in the decision” (Fowler 3). 
Justice William Douglas, authoring the majority opin-
ion, wrote  a  avor, a distinct quality,  is  lost  if  either 
sex is excluded” (Ballard). The Court’s analysis was not 
based on the fact that women and men are equal and 
both deserve to sit on juries, but rather, that women 
bring a distinct perspective to the jury process, and 
therefore, including them is essential to establishing a 
representative cross-section of  the community (Fowler 
4). Because California had no law preventing females 
from serving on juries, this decision did not have legis-
lative implications and struck down no laws.  Instead, 
the decision served as a mere af rmation that the Court 
believed women should serve on juries, rather than a 
judicial mandate that forced states to allow women to 
face consideration for jury service. 
Hernandez vs. Texas (1954) 
Before hearing another case regarding gender dis-
crimination in the selection of  juries, the Court heard 
Hernandez vs. Texas (347 US 475 (1954)). This case dealt 
with a Mexican national accused of  murder in Texas 
who faced an all-white jury. He claimed that his Equal 
Protection Clause rights had been violated due to the 
exclusion of  Mexicans on the jury, but the Court  rst 
required him to prove that Mexicans were a distinct 
“group” that gained protection under the clause (Her-
nandez). Previously, Mexicans were often considered 
“white” as evident by the single “Hispanic or white” 
option  in  most  demographic  surveys.  Hernande  
had to prove that he still faced discrimination. While 
Hernande   provided  several  statistical  examples  that 
demonstrated the racial discrimination against Mexi-
cans in Texas, Justice Warren, writing for the majority, 
pointed out that the original courthouse that heard the 
case had segregated toilets: one unlabeled and the other 
labeled  colored or hombres aqu   (Hernandez). In ad-
dition, Hernande  proved that although Mexicans were 
included on the jury rolls, they had not been present on 
a jury in this particular Texan county in 25 years (Her-
nandez). The Court ruled that Mexicans are a distinct 
group and are protected against jury discrimination by 
the Equal Protection Clause. With time, the Court elim-
inated avenues for de jure and de facto discrimination 
of  races, social classes, and gender to a certain degree 
in the process of  random jury selection. 
Hoyt vs. Florida (1961) 
However, when the Court was asked to rule on the 
issue of  de jure gender discrimination to solidify the 
Ballard precedent, the Court seemingly stalled the ex-
pansion of  juror rights. In Hoyt vs. Florida (368 US 57 
(1961)), a woman murdered her husband with a base-
ball bat after he admitted to in delity and rejected her 
attempts for reconciliation. Like many states, Florida 
had an af rmative registration policy that forced wom-
en to register in order to be considered for jury duty, 
whereas men were automatically registered (Hans and 
Vidmar 42). As a result, there were no women on the 
defendant’s jury because there were so few women reg-
istered. Justice John Harlan II, writing for the majority, 
stated that “despite the enlightened emancipation of  
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women from the restrictions and protections of  by-
gone years, and their entry into many parts of  com-
munity life formerly reserved to men, woman is still 
regarded as the center of  home and family life” (Hoyt). 
Therefore, he concluded, women have legitimate rea-
sons to avoid jury duty, and thus the state law was a 
rational means to attend to their needs. 
 Although Hoyt seems out of  line with the 
Court’s previous decisions regarding juries, it was just 
a further distinction. The issues in Strauder, Smith, and 
Thiel all dealt with state prevention of  particular classes 
of  jurors in the jury selection process. On the other 
hand, the Hoyt ruling found that women were not pre-
vented from participating in the jury selection process, 
they just had to take extra steps in order to place their 
name on the rolls. The ruling in Ballard did not apply 
to Hoyt either: Ballard regarded the happenstance of  
women’s elimination from an actual jury, while Hoyt 
pertained to the statute that led to the absence of  wom-
en on a particular jury. Despite emphasi ing the impor-
tance of  women on juries in Ballard, the ruling in Hoyt 
held that states could achieve this standard but it would 
be up to the women to register for jury selection rather 
than have the state do it automatically. As a result, Flor-
ida’s law stood and the Court’s jurisprudence explicitly 
solidi ed the legal differences between the sexes (Hoyt).
Eventually Congress solved almost all, if  not all, 
of  the Court’s previous problems by enacting the Jury 
Selection and Service Act (JSSA) of  1968 (Hale 237). 
JSSA required that federal courts to choose jurors from 
a voter registration list in the community. If  that list 
was not able to produce a representative cross-section 
it could be supplemented with other lists (Hale 243). 
While JSSA prevented states from using the “key man” 
system, it did not prohibit states from giving exemp-
tions to particular groups (Hale 268). As a result, many 
states continued to exempt women. Additionally, legal 
scholars argue that using voting registration lists is dis-
criminatory because only the most politically active reg-
ister to vote, leaving out a large swaths of  low-income 
and minority populations from being considered for 
jury selection (Hans and Vidmar 54). In fact, choosing 
jurors from voter registration rolls has been shown to 
decrease  voter  registration  numbers  because  citi ens 
fear selection for jury duty (Knack 99). Although the 
struggle for a more representative jury was not over, 
the passing of  JSSA was a turning point in the evolu-
tion of  jury selection and paved the way for the modern 
jury that the United States uses today.
The Creation of  the Modern Jury 
Post-JSSA
Duncan vs. Louisiana (1968)
Although JSSA only applied to federal juries, it was 
quickly applied to states through Supreme Court ac-
tion. In Duncan vs. Louisiana (1968) (391 US 145 (1968)), 
a  black  boy  named Gary Duncan  received  a   ne  of  
$150 and was sentenced to 60 days in prison for simple 
battery. Duncan requested a jury for his trial, but the 
Louisiana Constitution only guaranteed a jury for cap-
ital punishment and hard labor cases (Duncan). Justice 
Byron White, writing for a seven Justice majority stated, 
“The deep commitment of  the Nation to the right of  
jury trial in serious criminal cases as a defense against 
arbitrary  law enforcement quali es for protection un-
der the Due Process Clause of  the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and must therefore be respected by the States” 
(Duncan).  As  a  result,  the  Court  centrali ed  criminal 
court proceedings for the entire country,  nally extend-
ing  re ned Sixth Amendment  standards  to  all of   the 
states.
Taylor vs. Louisiana (1975) 
While Congress and the Supreme Court continued 
to  re ne  the  jury  selection process,  the past  decision 
of  Hoyt seemed incongruent with their new direction. 
In Taylor vs. Louisiana (419 US 522 (1975)), seven years 
after the passage of  JSSA, Louisiana still used an af-
 rmative registration policy for all  female jurors. Billy 
Taylor, the appellant, was a man charged with kidnap-
ping who claimed that his Sixth Amendment rights had 
been violated in virtue of  women being systematically 
excluded from the jury selection process (Taylor). While 
the Court admitted that hearing Taylor, on the surface, 
seemed unnecessary due to the Jury Service and Selec-
tion Act and the 30 years of  precedent discussed above, 
the Court had never answered whether af rmative reg-
istration deprived a defendant of  their Sixth Amend-
ment rights (Taylor). This is because Hoyt was based on 
Equal Protection claims, not the Sixth Amendment. 
In an 8-1 decision, the Court ruled that the system-
atic exclusion of  females from jury selection violated 
Taylor’s Sixth Amendment rights (Taylor). Although the 
Court attempted to distinguish between the Hoyt and 
Taylor rulings, Justice White, writing for the majority, 
emphasi ed that as time had passed, societal expecta-
tions had changed (Taylor). In Footnote 17, he lists off  
several Department of  Labor statistics that demon-
strate the large percentages of  women who work out-
side of  the home. That being said, the decision did ex-
tend permission to states to continue to regulate its jury 
selection procedures as long as it remained in alignment 
with the representative cross-section requirement that 
the Court had established (Taylor). Ultimately, Taylor 
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prevented the future use of  state-sponsored juror dis-
crimination legislation against women and overturned 
Hoyt vs. Florida (1961). 
Once the Court eliminated legislative routes to 
potential juror discrimination, it began to examine at-
torney-sponsored discrimination. As mentioned earlier, 
the voir dire process allows attorneys to question po-
tential jurors before a trial in order to determine who 
will serve on the jury. Attorneys have two options to 
eliminate jurors: challenge for cause and peremptory 
challenges. Since the judge or justice overseeing the 
speci c case must  approve challenges  for cause,  low-
er courts tend to handle these issues themselves. Pe-
remptory challenges, on the other hand, are up to the 
lawyer’s discretion and the lawyer does not have to dis-
close their reasoning for eliminating a potential juror. 
When the initial JSSA was debated in Congress, both 
challenge for cause and peremptory challenges were 
cited as one of  the remaining ways in which attorneys 
and courts could retain control over the juror selection 
process (Hale 238).
Swain vs. Alabama (1965)
The Court heard its  rst case about discriminato-
ry peremptory challenges before the JSSA even passed 
through Congress. In Swain vs. Alabama 380 US 202 
(1965)), Robert Swain, a black man, was sentenced to 
death by an all-white jury. He argued that his Equal 
Protection Clause rights were violated when the prose-
cution struck all black jurors from the pool during voir 
dire. Although the Court upheld the notion that sys-
tematically excluding jurors on the basis of  race is in 
violation of  the Equal Protection clause, a defendant 
would have to prove that a prosecutor was consistent-
ly racist, no matter the case or circumstance (Swain). 
Swain was unable to obtain this proof  of  a pattern of  
discrimination because it was a timely and costly en-
deavor, despite there having been no black juror who 
served on a jury in the county in  fteen years (Raphael 
and Ungvarsky 233). In addition, many states did not 
even keep lists of  the demographic characteristics of  
jurors, making it virtually impossible to prove a past 
pattern of  discrimination (Hale 261). Although the 
Court did address the issue of  performing peremptory 
challenges in a discriminatory way, the burden it placed 
on the defendant resulted in a very low probability of  
successfully challenging peremptory strikes. 
Batson vs. Kentucky (1986) 
This all changed with Batson vs. Kentucky (476 US 
79 (1986)). In 1986, James Batson was arrested in Ken-
tucky for second-degree burglary (Batson). During the 
voir dire before his trial, the prosecutor used his pe-
remptory challenges to strike all four black potential ju-
rors from the juror list (Batson). Batson argued that this 
was in violation of  his Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury and in violation of  the Equal Protection 
Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, 
represented by Justice Lewis Powell writing the majori-
ty opinion, agreed. After asserting that prosecutors may 
use peremptory challenges in any manner they choose, 
Justice Powell stated, “The Equal Protection Clause 
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors 
solely on account of  their race or on the assumption 
that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially 
to consider the State’s case against a black defendant” 
(Batson). With this, using peremptory challenges to 
eliminate jurors on the sole basis of  race was ruled un-
constitutional. 
To correct the limitations of  Swain, the Court pro-
vided a legitimate test to be used in order to challenge 
a peremptory strike on the basis of  race through Bat-
son called “The Batson Test” (More Perfect). First, if  
a defendant suspects that a prosecutor is wielding dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges, they must assert a 
prima facie case of  discrimination (Batson). ‘Prima fa-
cie  means  based  on   rst  impressions;  therefore,  this 
does not require extensive background investigations 
by the defendant. In presenting their prima facie claim, 
defendants may  cite  actions  at  their  speci c  trial,  de-
parting from the consideration of  all trials of  a par-
ticular prosecutor as proscribed in Swain. In addition, 
presenting a prima facie challenge requires defendants 
to pass a three-pronged test. First, the defendant must 
show that he or she is a member of  a  cogni able racial 
group… and that the prosecutor has exercised peremp-
tory challenges to remove from the venire members of  
the defendant’s race” (Batson). Second, the defendant 
may rely on the fact that peremptory challenges con-
stitute a “jury selection practice that permits those to 
discriminate who are of  mind to discriminate” (Batson). 
Finally, the defendant must use these facts to “raise an 
inference,” or confer to others, that the prosecutor was 
attempting to eliminate the jurors in question because 
of  their race (Batson).
After a defendant has demonstrated a legitimate 
prima facie challenge to a peremptory strike, the sec-
ond part of  the test requires the state and prosecutor 
to come forward with a race-neutral reason as to why 
they excluded the black juror(s) (Batson). Although the 
fundamental feature of  peremptory challenges is that 
they can be exercised without explanation, the Court 
silenced these foreseeable objections by specifying that 
the race neutral reasoning does not have to meet the 
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level of  the reasoning for a challenge for cause (Batson). 
A race neutral reason cannot be, however, that the elim-
inated juror would be partial to the defendant because 
of  their race (Batson). Although older than the Ameri-
can legal system itself  (More Perfect), the peremptory 
challenge is not a constitutionally guaranteed part of  
the American criminal justice system which allows the 
Court to comfortably place limits on it (Batson). 
With Batson, the Court argued that racial discrimi-
nation against potential jurors not only hurts the defen-
dant, but also those who are called for jury duty. While 
this was consistent with the Strauder vs. West Virginia 
ruling in 1880, Justice Powell asserted that jury discrim-
ination was also harmful to the community at large, as 
“selection procedures that purposefully exclude black 
persons  from  juries  undermine  public  con dence  in 
the fairness of  our system of  justice” (Batson). Justice 
 owell  emphasi ed  the  less  obvious  but  equally  pro-
found consequences of  discrimination that erode the 
integrity of  the justice system anytime a juror is dis-
missed due to race.
Although Batson established a speci c test to con-
front the issues of  racial discrimination, the case is also 
notable for Justice Thurgood Marshall’s concurrence. 
Justice Marshall, a pioneer in the legal-based anti-racial 
discrimination movement through his work with the 
National Association for the Advancement of  Colored 
People, stated “The decision will not end the racial dis-
crimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selec-
tion process. That goal can be accomplished only by 
eliminating peremptory challenges entirely” (Batson). 
This reignited a long-standing debate within the legal 
community about peremptory challenges.
Although peremptory challenges are used in order 
to discriminate and eliminate jurors based on demo-
graphic characteristics, they are also used as a barrier 
to racial discrimination. An attorney, for example, can 
gauge from body language and verbal cues that a po-
tential juror holds racial bias, but they cannot eliminate 
this juror unless the juror explicitly states that they are 
racist. In this case, the attorney would need the pe-
remptory challenge. This highlights how even attorneys 
working against racial bias need the peremptory chal-
lenge. With the Batson decision, the Court allowed the 
peremptory challenge avenue for racial discrimination 
to remain open, although restrained.
 
Holland vs. Illinois (1990) 
Following Batson, there was a string of  cases ad-
dressing issues that arose from the decision. In Holland 
vs. Illinois (493 US 474 (1990)), a white defendant was 
accused of  multiple felony charges and accused the 
state of  violating his Sixth Amendment rights to be 
tried by a representative cross-section of  the commu-
nity. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, de-
termined that although the defendant in question was 
white and therefore not a member of  a  cogni able ra-
cial group,” (Batson) the defendant still had grounds to 
sue since he was addressing a Sixth Amendment chal-
lenge instead of  an Equal Protection Clause challenge 
(Holland). The Court ruled that the elimination of  black 
jurors in this particular case was constitutional, since 
the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a presence 
of  a particular cogni able group (Holland). This means 
that Batson cannot be applied to Sixth Amendment 
cases and is only valid for Equal Protection issues. Ac-
cordingly, Justice Scalia asserted that no issues of  Equal 
Protection were raised in this case because the petition-
er was a white man (Holland). The Court ruled that his 
conviction should stand and that the jury selection pro-
cess was constitutional.
Powers vs. Ohio (1991)
 
In Powers vs. Ohio (499 US 400 (1991)), departing 
slightly from Holland, a white defendant argued that the 
elimination of  black jurors through peremptory chal-
lenges constituted a violation of  the Equal Protection 
Clause, not the Sixth Amendment, and that his own race 
was irrelevant to the constitutional question. Therefore, 
the question concerned whether a white man who is 
a defendant has  standing  (i.e.,  a  suf cient connection 
to the harm stemming from a law or action) to  le an 
Equal Protection Clause on behalf  of  black jurors. The 
Court ruled that although “an individual juror does not 
have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, he or she 
does possess the right not to be excluded from one on 
account of  race” (Powers). Unlike in Holland, the Court 
emphasi ed the impact of  discriminatory jury selection 
on the jurors themselves. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority demonstrat-
ed the above in his opinion, adding that even though 
Powers was a white man, he had standing in this case 
because any racial discrimination in the jury selection 
process “casts doubt” on the eventual verdict as a 
whole – ultimately directly affecting both parties and 
the whole system (Powers). Furthermore, defendants 
have a large incentive to advocate against jury discrim-
ination  in  their  case  speci cally  because  this  can  po-
tentially lead to the reversal of  a verdict (Powers). Even 
further, a defendant may  le these  third-party  claims 
in regards to a violation of  someone else’s rights under 
the Equal Protection Clause because the incentives for 
an eliminated juror to raise a discrimination claim are 
low (Powers). Any defendant, white or black, is able to 
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bring a discrimination suit with regards to the rights of  
the jurors because both parties are affected: the defen-
dant has a large personal incentive to challenge their 
selection, and because jurors are unlikely to bring these 
claims themselves. Although the Powers precedent seems 
to contradict the Holland precedent, it does not—Hol-
land addressed a Sixth Amendment claim, while Powers 
addressed the Equal Protection Clause.
Edmonson vs. Leesville Concrete Company (1991) 
The ruling in Powers would soon be tested when 
Thaddeus Edmonson slipped and fell while working 
his construction job and sued in civil court for  nan-
cial compensation (500 US 614 (1991)). In Edmonson 
vs. Leesville Concrete Company (1991), the attorneys repre-
senting Leesville Concrete Company struck almost all 
the black jurors using peremptory challenges. However, 
the Equal Protection Clause only protects against state 
action, and in a civil case, both parties are considered 
private actors. Therefore, Edmonson forced the Court to 
consider whether or not Batson challenges are applica-
ble in civil trials. 
Lugar vs. Edmondson Oil Company (1982) 
In order to test whether Batson should apply to 
civil cases, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
used a two-pronged test from a different case, Lugar 
vs. Edmondson Oil Company (457 US 922 (1982)). First, 
he would have to determine whether the “claimed con-
stitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of  a 
right or privilege having its source in state authority” 
(Edmonson). Second, “whether the private party charged 
with the deprivation could be described in all fairness 
as a state actor” (Edmonson). Justice Kennedy asserted 
that the peremptory challenge absolutely had its source 
in state power as it has no use outside of  a court of  law 
(Edmonson). In addition, the Court determined that any 
actor that relies on  signi cant assistance from state of-
 cials  is a state actor, and since the system of  peremp-
tory challenges strongly relies on the American justice 
system, Leesville Concrete Company was determined 
to be a state actor (Edmonson). With these two criteria 
met,  the Court s  extension  of   the  right  to   le Equal 
Protection claims on behalf  of  jurors to civil trials de-
termined that Edmonson met all the criteria established 
in Powers.
Georgia vs. McCollum (1992) 
Although the Court determined that a company in 
a civil suit was a state actor, they had still only ruled on 
the use of  peremptory challenges by the state, state ac-
tors, and the prosecution. However, both prosecution 
and defense were able to exercise peremptory challeng-
es in a trial, meaning the defense in any trial was legally 
able to eliminate jurors on the basis of  race. This was 
addressed in the case of  Georgia vs. McCollum (505 US 
42 (1992)), where three white men were arrested for 
assaulting  a black man.  hen  the prosecution  led a 
motion to prevent the defense from using peremptory 
challenges in order to eliminate black potential jurors, 
the Georgia court denied their request, stating that no 
Supreme Court decision prohibited the defense from 
using peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory 
manner (Georgia).
When this reached the Supreme Court, the Court 
ruled in a 7-2 decision that there are four main reasons 
that a defendant may not exercise racially discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges. First, racial discrimination 
of  jurors through peremptory challenges harms the in-
dividual juror by subjecting him to “open and public” 
racial discrimination (Georgia). Second, Justice Harry 
Blackmun addressed the Equal Protection clause and 
the state-action requirement in writing that a defen-
dant’s exercise of  peremptories does constitute state 
action, as it helps to compile a state sponsored body 
-- the jury (Georgia). Third, the state has standing to sue 
because it “suffer[s] a concrete injury when the fairness 
and the integrity of  its own judicial process is under-
mined” (Georgia). Finally, the Court added that the de-
nial of  discriminatory exercise of  peremptory challeng-
es does not violate any constitutional rights, as no one 
has a right to utili e any strategy to racially discriminate 
(Georgia).
With Georgia, the Court broadly expanded the rul-
ing of  Batson. Their  ruling  nally held  that  the racial-
ly discriminatory use of  peremptory challenges was 
unconstitutional, no matter which party in a case at-
tempts to use them. Beginning in 1990, the Court start-
ed quickly addressing some remaining issues with the 
Batson ruling with Holland, Powers, Edmonson, and Georgia 
which were decided in the span of  two years. That be-
ing said, the Court still remained silent on the issue of  
discriminatory uses of  peremptory challenges relating 
to gender. 
J.E.B. vs. Alabama (1994) 
In 1994, the Court decided to hear a case relating 
to the gender in the form of  J.E.B. vs. Alabama (511 US 
127 (1994)). The defendant was a white male who ne-
glected to pay child support. The prosecution struck all 
male jurors from the pool with the notion that female 
jurors would be more sympathetic to a woman seeking 
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child support (J.E.B). The Court, led by Justice Black-
mun, decided that since the defendant’s claim was based 
on the stereotype that women would be less sympathet-
ic to a man, it was in violation of  the Equal Protection 
Clause (J.E.B). The Court’s analysis was based almost 
solely on a discussion of  the rights of  the female ju-
rors. In this case, they had a right to not be ideologically 
stereotyped into having a particular opinion about child 
support payments. This strayed from the previous fo-
cus on the rights of  the defense and prosecution, and 
therefore, it was determined that a strike against any 
potential juror for their gender is enough to constitute 
a violation of  the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court deliberately asserted that preventing the 
elimination of  jurors based on gender did not eliminate 
the total use of  a peremptory challenge, since attorneys 
may present gender-neutral reasons for striking jurors 
in the same procedure that Batson establishes (J.E.B). 
This case, due to the previous ruling in Georgia, applies 
to both the defense and prosecution. In accordance, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s agreed that the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibited the elimination of  jurors 
on the basis of  gender from state actors, but she also 
believed that “like race, gender matters” (J.E.B). There-
fore, there were legitimate reasons to eliminate a juror 
based on gender, and a defendant needs to have rights 
to eliminate jurors based on their gender in order to pro-
tect them against the state. This was, however, almost 
a moot point since the rights of  jurors outweighed the 
rights of  the defendant. The majority did not address 
the rights of  the defendant and instead only considered 
the rights of  potential jurors. Just like Justice Thurgood 
Marshall’s concurrence in Batson, Justice O’Connor’s 
took the majority’s opinion a step further. 
Conclusion
After J.E.B., the Court rarely heard large impact 
cases relating to racial or gender discrimination in the 
jury selection process. The cases they did hear were 
very fact speci c and did not result in any broad reach-
ing precedents. That being said, in a post-Batson and 
J.E.B. United States, discrimination continues to persist 
in jury selection. First, after Batson and J.E.B., many or-
gani ations that advised lawyers on courtroom tactics 
and behavior began writing how-to guides that taught 
the art of  discreetly continuing discrimination through 
the use of  peremptory challenges (Object Anyway). For 
example, a webpage from the National Legal Research 
Group titled “Exercising Peremptory Challenges in 
Light of  J.E.B” is littered with advice such as “keep 
good records” and “do not highlight race or gender in 
your records.”  In fact, in the most recent Batson case 
brought to the Supreme Court, Foster vs. Chatman (2016) 
(578  US       (2016)),  a  Georgia  attorney  labeled  all 
black jurors with a lowercase ‘b’ next to their name in 
his notes. These black jurors were later eliminated from 
the jury pool through the use of  peremptory challeng-
es. This labeling inspired Justice Elena Kagan to retort, 
“Isn’t this the clearest Batson violation we have ever 
seen?” during oral arguments (More Perfect). In addi-
tion, Foster even led famous legal scholar and journalist, 
Linda Greenhouse, to suggest that the Court should 
evaluate the constitutionality of  peremptory challenges 
as a whole in the next term, a reminder of  Justice Thur-
good Marshall’s original concurrence in Batson (Green-
house).
Additionally, if  the ‘neutral’ explanations given by 
prosecutors for their racial and gendered elimination of  
jurors are often accepted rather than questioned, then 
the effects of  Batson are diluted. In fact, researchers Mi-
chael Raphael and Edward Ungvarsky present a hypo-
thetical potential juror who is named Pat (Raphael and 
Ungvarsky 233). Pat happens to be an African Ameri-
can woman. In order to eliminate Pat, a prosecutor can:
Show either that Pat has served on a jury be-
fore, or that Pat has never served on a jury 
before. The prosecutor can explain that Pat is 
young or that Pat is old. He can say that he 
does not want a juror with Pat’s occupation for 
this case, or that Pat is unemployed. If  Pat or 
Pat’s relatives have had any involvement with 
law enforcement in the past, the prosecutor 
can exclude Pat regardless of  whether the in-
volvement has some connection to Pat. The 
prosecutor can declare that something in Pat’s 
demeanor is bothersome. The prosecutor can 
even focus on a random aspect of  the juror’s 
character or past dealings, even if  it only re-
motely relates to some aspect of  the case or to 
the legal process in general (Raphael and Un-
gvarsky 237).
Not only do prosecutors have a large amount of  le-
gally acceptable options at their disposal for addressing 
a Batson challenge, but judges are also often reluctant to 
deny a prosecutor’s “neutral reasoning” because they 
often work with the same group of  prosecutors and 
like to maintain a positive working relationship (Green-
house). Bryan Stevenson, founder of  the organi ation 
Equal Justice Initiative which practices law in the Deep 
South, cites another example of  an unreasonable neu-
tral explanation that passed the judge’s Batson standard 
(More Perfect). In his particular case, the prosecutor 
struck two black jurors and explained that they lived 
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in the same part of  town as the defendant (More Per-
fect). Although this explanation appeared neutral, many 
towns in the South are still racially segregated, mak-
ing this explanation directly correlated with race. The 
judge, however, still accepted the “neutral” explanation.
Not all research points to a failing Batson system. 
In one study, the author found that conclusions were 
drawn about the broader population based off  of  re-
sults from a small sample si e. This was seen in with a 
country in North Carolina actually over representing 
particular populations that were present in voir dire 
(Rose 700). If  the initial makeup of  a jury pool was 
nine percent African American, then the representation 
on the jury in this study was often higher for that par-
ticular population. 
The Court has ruled on very few Batson cases in 
recent years, but legal scholars have begun to con-
template expanding Batson’s ruling to other cogni able 
groups such as members of  the LGBTQ communi-
ty and members of  particular religions. The Supreme 
Court has not expanded Batson to these groups yet, but 
it is important to note that it will likely be a lengthy 
process seeing as it originally took the Court 18 years 
to expand the ruling to gender. In March of  2017, the 
Court addressed racial discrimination retroactively by 
allowing a judge to declare a new trial if  it is discovered 
that jurors made racist comments in the jury delibera-
tion room (Pena-Rodriguez).  If  biased jurors successfully 
get chosen from voir dire, judges now have a corrective 
measure that they can use – but only if  jurors blatant-
ly display their bias during deliberation. Although the 
Court is slow to expand Batson, the Justices are aware 
and responsive to conversations around discrimination. 
As the United States continues to engage in an evolving 
dialogue about the intersections between racial, gender, 
sexual, and religious discrimination within the justice 
system, the Court has the capacity to effectuate change 
in accordance. 
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